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Abstract: In this paper I argue that in Western contemporary societies testimony is 
structured by norms of reciprocation and thus is best understood as a involving the 
exchange of gifts rather than, as philosophers and game theorists have tended to presume, 
market transactions. My argument is based on an initial analysis of the reactive attitudes 
that are exhibited in testimonial exchanges. I highlight the central role played by the 
reciprocating attitudes of gratitude and gratification respectively in the recipient and the 
donor of testimony. This analysis leads to an account of the speech act of telling that is the 
primary vehicle of testimony. Telling, I argue, is a commissive but it is not, as it is usually 
presumed, akin to promising. Instead, its nature is that of an offer of a gift. Finally, I develop 
an account of the norms of trust and trustfulness as reciprocating social norms. I show that 
adopting these norms provides a particularly effective solution of the problem of 
cooperation. The solution is particularly effective because it incentivises both the sharing of 
epistemic goods and the acquisition of further such goods so that one is able to share them. 
 
 
 
The epistemic practice of testimony as the transfer of epistemic goods is a solution to a 
problem of cooperation with regard to the pooling of information. In every community 
some individuals possess epistemic goods such as knowledge, understanding, truth or 
warranted belief that would be valuable to other community members who do not have 
them. Also, the community as a whole would typically be better off if these epistemic goods 
ǁeƌe shaƌed, so that its ŵeŵďeƌs͛ Ŷeeds foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ Đould ďe satisfied. Hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe 
are non-epistemic motives why those who possess valuable epistemic resources might wish 
to deprive others the enjoyment of the same in order to benefit from their positional 
advantage.1 Yet ultimately everyone is better off if one is a member of a community where 
 
1 For a persuasive defence of the view that these problems arise primarily when agents have mixed epistemic 
and selfish motives see Henderson and Graham (2017b). 
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people share information rather than keep it secret or mislead others. Testimony as a 
practice governed by norms of trust and trustworthiness is a human solution to this 
problem.2  
In this paper I argue that in Western contemporary societies testimony is structured 
by norms of reciprocation and thus is best understood as involving the exchange of gifts 
rather than, as philosophers and game theorists have tended to presume, market 
transactions. My argument is based on an initial analysis of the reactive attitudes that are 
exhibited in testimonial exchanges. I highlight the central role played by the reciprocating 
attitudes of gratitude and gratification respectively in the recipient and the donor of 
testimony. This analysis leads to an account of the speech act of telling that is the primary 
vehicle of testimony. Telling, I argue, is a commissive but it is not, as it is usually presumed, 
akin to promising. Instead, its nature is that of an offer of a gift.3 Finally, I develop an 
account of the norms of trust and trustfulness as reciprocating social norms. I show that 
adopting these norms provides a particularly effective solution to the problem of 
cooperation. The solution is particularly effective because it incentivises both the sharing of 
epistemic goods and the acquisition of further such goods so that one is able to share them. 
The paper consists of four sections. In the first I explain the cooperation problem 
that testimony emerged to solve and why it is a problem. In the second I describe the 
reactive attitudes surrounding testimony and highlight the circumstances in which they are 
fitting. In the third section I offer an analysis of telling as the making of an offer akin to the 
giving of a gift. In the final section I argue that the norms of testimony are reciprocating 
norms that are characteristic of gift economies. I also argue that the development of a 
practice that treats testimony as the offer of a gift provides a more effective solution to the 
cooperation problem for epistemic goods than would be offered by a practice that treats 
them as market goods. 
 
2 I this follow Henderson (2018) and Henderson and Graham (2017a) in presuming that some epistemic norms 
are social norms because they consist of complex normative expectations that constrain the conduct of 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌs. These Ŷoƌŵs aƌe soĐial ďeĐause theǇ ĐaŶ ďe histoƌiĐallǇ aŶd ĐultuƌallǇ ǀaƌiaďle. 
However, unlike Henderson and Graham I use the teƌŵ ͚soĐial Ŷoƌŵ͛ iŶ a diffeƌeŶt seŶse thaŶ that offeƌed ďǇ 
Bicchieri (2006, p. 11). The main difference is the claim central to this paper that some normative expectations 
are not oughts but have instead a weaker normative force. 
3 Granted it is possible to offer a promise, but to make such an offer is not to have made the promise. 
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1. The Problem of Cooperation 
 
In every society, no matter how primitive, where individuals are able to communicate with 
each other there are significant societal advantages if members of the group share 
information. In most circumstances some individuals have positional advantages over 
others. For example, they might find themselves in a location that allows them to observe 
something and thus acquire information. Such information might be of value to others who 
do not possess it because they were not in the right place at the right time. In many such 
cases the group as a whole would be better off if those who possess useful information 
were prepared to share it. 
However, as is well known, there are disincentives to sharing. Whilst ceteris paribus 
it is alǁaǇs iŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ self-interest if others communicate to one valuable information 
that oŶe does Ŷot possess, it is at tiŵes iŶ oŶe͛s self-interest not to share such information 
with others. This situation gives rise to the so-Đalled ͚fƌee ƌideƌ͛ pƌoďleŵ. The pƌoďleŵ 
emerges when, although every person is worse off if no one cooperates and better off if 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ does, eaĐh peƌsoŶ͛s ďest outĐoŵe is foƌ eǀeƌǇoŶe else to Đoopeƌate ǁheŶ she 
does Ŷot. This situatioŶ, kŶoǁŶ as a pƌisoŶeƌ͛s dileŵŵa, ƌepƌeseŶts oŶe kiŶd of Đase iŶ 
which cooperation is hard to achieve (Axelrod, 1984, ch. 1).4 Even in these circumstances 
cooperation is likely to emerge if the people involved know that they will repeatedly find 
themselves in the same situation, since it may pay off to develop a reputation as a nice guy 
(Bicchieri, 2006, p. 143). However, in the case of a large group of loosely associated 
individuals there might be no reason to believe that the two people will find themselves in 
the same situation in future. If that is the case, the problem of cooperation will emerge.5 
The view that the epistemic practice of testimony has developed in response to 
pƌisoŶeƌ͛s dileŵŵas has ďeeŶ defeŶded ďǇ Williams (2002) and more recently by Faulkner 
 
4 I prefer to think of the issue in these terms rather than as a public goods problem because I do not wish to 
presume that participants take knowledge to be akin to a common fund. 
5 Strictly speaking there are more constrains, see Axelrod (1984). 
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(2014). Both have argued that this epistemic practice is governed by paired social norms of 
trust and trustworthiness that obligate the recipient of the testimony to trust the testifier, 
whilst the giver of testimony has a duty to be trustworthy. That is, the testifier is under an 
obligation to be sincere and epistemically competent whenever they engage in the act of 
testimony; whilst the recipient of the testimony ought to trust the testifier. 
Williams suggests that there are no game-theoretic solutions to this problem of 
cooperation because as long as individuals value sincerity only as means to self-interested 
goals the incentives to defect will always render cooperation unstable and prone to 
breaking down (2002, pp. 58-60). Faulkner endorses this conclusion with regard to 
encounters that might be a one-off aŶd ǁheƌe ďoth paƌties aƌe igŶoƌaŶt aďout eaĐh otheƌ͛s 
previous behaviour. He also offers an account of what it means to say that the problem of 
cooperation is solved only when agents value sincerity intrinsically or from the inside. In 
FaulkŶeƌ͛s ǀieǁ this ƌeƋuiƌes that iŶdiǀiduals folloǁ the iŵpeƌatiǀe to ďe siŶĐeƌe for the 
ƌight ƌeasoŶ oƌ ŵotiǀe ǁhiĐh, iŶ this iŶstaŶĐe, is otheƌ people͛s Ŷeed foƌ ǀaluaďle 
information. The norm of trustworthiness therefore supplies a reason to be sincere when 
deliberating over whether to share testimony (Faulkner, 2014, pp. 182-186). 
These considerations lead Faulkner to offer the following accounts of the paired 
norms of trustworthiness and trust. The norm of trustworthiness is the obligation that 
speakers be trustworthy, where to be trustworthy is to tell the truth informatively for the 
reason that the other person depends on one for the truth (informatively told) (2014, pp. 
147-148). The paired norm of trust is the obligation that the audience trusts the speaker; 
that is, the audience takes the speaker to tell the truth informatively for the reason that the 
audience needs to be told (2014, pp. 146-149). 
Faulkner argues that these norms govern our testimonial practice on the grounds 
that it is shaped by negative reactive attitudes such as resentment and disappointment. He 
notes that in a testimonial exchange both the testifier and the recipient of the testimony 
have expectations about the behaviour of the other party. The recipient of the testimony 
expects the testifier to be informed and sincere, whilst the testifier expects to be believed. 
These expectations are not mere predictions, even though they might include predictions. 
The recipient of testimony normatively expects to be told the truth informatively as elicited 
in her disposition to resent a speaker if the speaker is not motivated ďǇ the audieŶĐe͛s Ŷeed 
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for information to supply it (Faulkner, 2014, p. 181). 6 The testifier normatively expects to be 
believed. That is, she expects the audience to believe what she says because the audience 
presumes that its need for information is what motivates the speaker to supply it. This 
expectation is normative since the speaker resents her audience if the audience does not 
ďelieǀe that the speakeƌ͛s ŵotiǀe foƌ heƌ testiŵoŶǇ is to satisfǇ the audieŶĐe͛s Ŷeed foƌ 
information. 
To summarise, on FaulkŶeƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt the episteŵiĐ pƌaĐtiĐe of testiŵoŶǇ is goǀeƌŶed 
by two social norms of trust and trustworthiness. In his view, these norms are orders or 
imperatives (2014, p. 179). They prescribe conduct so that those who are subject to them 
acquire mandatory obligations to act as the norms order them to. The testifier has an 
obligation to the people who trust her to be trustworthy. Conversely, the recipients of 
testimony have an obligation to trust the speaker. These social norms would be instituted 
and maintained thanks to the punitive attitudes of resentment and disapproval, and to 
sanctioning behaviour directed against those who violate them (2014, p. 179).7 
In what follows I argue that Faulkner is right that the epistemic practice of testimony 
is structured by the norms of trust and trustworthiness and that these are the norms that 
solve the problem of cooperation. He is, however, mistaken about the nature of these 
norms because they are not typically prescriptive norms issuing mandatory obligations. 
FaulkŶeƌ͛s pƌesuŵptioŶ that these Ŷoƌŵs aƌe iŵpeƌatiǀes has led hiŵ to igŶoƌe that 
testimony most frequently elicits positive reactive attitudes of gratitude and gratification. 
These attitudes indicate that the norms of trust and trustworthiness supply reasons whose 
normative status is not that of mandatory obligations. The presence of these attitudes also 
indicates that the speech act of giving testimony is not analogous to promising but to 
offering. These features of the practice of testimony, I argue, are crucial if we are to 
understand why it is a particularly effective solution to the problem of cooperation. 
 
6 For Faulkner, the norms of trust institute an obligation to tell the truth informatively. This includes an 
obligation to speak when one has the truth and an obligation not to lie or mislead. In the absence of the first 
obligation the norms of trust would not solve the problem of cooperation since speakers would not be under 
any normative pressure to share information. 
7 For Faulkner, if the audience trusts a speaker in accordance with what the norm of trust requires, this trust 
fuƌŶishes the audieŶĐe ǁith aŶ eǆplaŶatoƌǇ episteŵiĐ ƌeasoŶ to ďelieǀe ǁhat it is told. The audieŶĐe͛s ďelief 
that the speakeƌ is ĐoŵpeteŶt aŶd siŶĐeƌe, ǁhiĐh is paƌt of the audieŶĐe͛s tƌustiŶg attitude, gives it a reason to 
believe that the testimony is true even though this reason is not an evidential reason that the content of the 
testimony is true (Faulkner, 2014, pp. 202-203). 
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2. Testimonial Exchanges and Reactive Attitudes 
 
In this section I describe some of the reactive attitudes that are frequently elicited in 
testimonial exchanges.8 These attitudes aƌe tǇpiĐallǇ ƌespoŶses to otheƌs͛ aĐtiǀities that 
manifest their regard or disregard, good or ill will toward us (Strawson, 2008, pp. 10-11).9 
Reactive attitudes are elicited by normative expectations about agents͛ ĐoŵpoƌtŵeŶt, that 
is, expectations about what they have a reason to do, or not to do, what is permissible, 
obligatory or prohibited for them. Thus, understanding the reactive attitudes that surround 
testimonial exchanges should give us a grip on the social norms that govern these 
transactions.10 
Testimonial encounters can elicit both negative and positive reactive attitudes. 
Negative attitudes include resentment and disappointment. Positive attitudes centrally 
involve gratitude and gratification. In what follows I provide thumbnail sketches of some 
hypothetical cases in which these reactions seem warranted. 
 
1. Testimonial insult – S and A are at a party organised by a common friend, but have 
never met before. S tells A that there are no cold beers in the fridge. A immediately 
goes to the fridge ostensibly to check whether there are any beers left. S feels 
insulted and resents A.11 
 
8 I am exclusively concerned with testimony about factual rather than ethical or evaluative matters. 
9 One may also experience such attitudes vicariously on behalf of the treatment to which a third party is 
subjected. ͚Good ǁill͛ ƌefeƌs to the nature of the regard or concern that one has for others (McKenna, 2012, p. 
59). An expression of good will is an action that benefits a person and that is undertaken out of a concern for 
that person. 
10 I thus presume that in many instances at least these attitudes are fitting. 
11 One might argue that resentment is at home in this case only because S and A are already cooperating given 
that theǇ aƌe eŶgagiŶg iŶ the saŵe aĐtiǀitǇ. Daƌǁall͛s (2017) take on these issues would suggest such an 
approach. In this paper I wish to set aside issues concerning the legitimate expectations that friends might 
haǀe ǁith ƌegaƌd to eaĐh otheƌ͛s testiŵoŶǇ. WithiŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of a pƌe-existing bond sharing information 
might be obligatory even though in the absence of these connections not sharing is permissible. This paper is 
only focused on testimonial exchanges between people who do not already care for each other and thus 
cannot be presumed to be cooperating. 
7 
 
 
2. Testimonial betrayal – S and A do not know each other but find themselves waiting 
together on a standby list to board an overbooked ferry. S tells A that the ticket 
officer has told her to return in one hour to check whether any places are available. 
A returns after an hour to discover that S has lied to her and that all standby tickets 
have now been allocated. A feels betrayed and resents S. 
 
3. Testifier disappointment – S and A are at a party organised by a common friend, but 
have never met before. S tells A that there are no cold beers in the fridge. After a 
while S sees A checking whether there are any beers in the fridge. Realising that S is 
looking quizzical, A nods and smiles in an apologetic manner. S nonetheless feels let 
down by, and is disappointed in, A.12 
 
4. Audience disappointment -S and A do not know each other but find themselves 
waiting together on a standby list to board an overbooked ferry. S tells A that the 
ticket officer has told her to return in one hour to check whether any places are 
available. A returns after an hour to discover that all standby tickets have now been 
allocated. S is apologetic to A claiming to have been wrong to listen to the ticket 
officer. Nevertheless, A feels let down by, and disappointed in, S. 
 
5. Testimonial gratitude - S and A do not know each other. S sees A struggling with a 
local map. S approaches A. A asks for directions, and S supplies them. A is grateful 
and thanks S. 
 
 
12 Note that this is an interpersonal kind of disappointment because it is disappointment in a person. It is 
different from the kind of disappointment that one feels when a much anticipated outcome does not 
eventuate (Martin, 2014, p. 129). The latter form of disappointment includes disappointment as the reaction 
to a failure to deliver by something or someone that one relied on (Baier, 1986). 
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6. Testimonial gratification - S and A do not know each other. S sees A struggling with a 
local map. S approaches A. A asks for directions, and S supplies them. A is grateful 
and thanks S. S feels good about herself and is gratified. 
 
The idea that it is iŶsultiŶg Ŷot ďe ďelieǀed ďǇ oŶe͛s audieŶĐe ǁheŶ oŶe has ŵade aŶ 
assertion purporting to give them information has an illustrious pedigree. G. E. M. 
Anscombe and J. L. Austin, have claimed that it is insulting or mortifying not to be taken at 
oŶe͛s ǁoƌd (Anscombe, 1979, p. 150; Austin, 1961, p. 68). ‘efusiŶg soŵeoŶe͛s testiŵoŶǇ, ďǇ 
not taking her at her words, would - at least sometimes - be insulting because it exhibits a 
laĐk of due ƌegaƌd foƌ soŵeoŶe͛s iŶteƌests, status or concern (Daly, 2018). It tends to 
diminish its target and lower him or her in social status. 13 Resentment would follow because 
it is a natural response to actions that are interpreted as insulting or constituting a slight.  
What is said to be insulting in cases of refused testimony is that the speaker is not 
taken at her word, that is to say, she is not trusted.14 It is worth noting that one might not 
ďe ďelieǀed eǀeŶ though oŶe͛s audieŶĐe ďelieǀes ǁhat oŶe has said. Foƌ eǆaŵple, suppose 
that S tells A that the train strike has ended so that the school away-day is on. A might 
believe what S says without believing S because A thinks that S is both a liar and a prankster. 
A presumes that S, knowing of her own reputation as a liar, might tell the truth as a prank 
ĐouŶtiŶg oŶ A͛s distƌust. A thiŶks “ is douďle-bluffing and thus believes what S says. If S does 
not think of herself as a liar, she might feel insulted by A and resents her, even though A 
believes what S said. Hence, testimonial insult can take place even when the audience 
believes what a speaker said provided that the audience does not believe the speaker.15 
Not every instance in which testimony is refused because the speaker has not been 
believed, is one in which the speaker resents people who do not believe her.16 There are 
cases in which the lack of testimonial uptake is justified. For example, the audience might 
 
13 There are histoƌiĐal ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ Ŷot to ďe takeŶ at oŶe͛s ǁoƌd is eǆpeƌieŶĐed as a diŵiŶutioŶ iŶ soĐial 
status. In England, at least, in the modern period gentlemen and only gentlemen were taken at their word. 
Thus, to haǀe oŶe͛s testiŵoŶǇ ƌefused ǁas to ďe tƌeated as someone of a lower rank (Shapin, 1994). 
14 There is a very small literature on testimonial insult. Hazlett (2017) restricts his discussion to cases where the 
individuals involved have a pre-existing social or emotional bond. Malcolm (2018), however, aims to give a 
general account. 
15 Malcolm (2018) is insufficiently attentive to this point. 
16 It is also worth noting that different contexts might be regulated by different social norms. For instance, 
aĐadeŵiĐs ƌeadiŶg Đolleagues͛ ǁoƌk aƌe eǆpeĐted to take a sĐeptical attitude rather than a trusting one. 
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not believe a speaker on a given occasion because the audience has independent reasons 
not to believe what she said. In listening to “͛s testiŵoŶǇ, A ŵight ƌealise that “ is uŶaǁaƌe 
of an important development, and thus A acquires reasons not to believe what S says, and 
thus a forteriori Ŷot to ďelieǀe “. Whilst, if “ is Ŷot aǁaƌe of A͛s ŵotiǀes foƌ ƌefusiŶg heƌ 
testimony, S might reseŶt A, ǁe should eǆpeĐt heƌ, upoŶ leaƌŶiŶg of A͛s ƌeasoŶs, to see A͛s 
behaviour as justified rather than exhibiting ill will or disregard for S. In these circumstances 
S does not, or at least should not, resent A because A has not insulted S. Further, S would 
have no reason to be disappointed in A. 
Similarly, S generally would not be warranted in feeling resentful of people who do 
not believe her, but whom she has not addressed in her testimony. Suppose that S tells A, 
within the earshot of C, that the train strike has ended and that the school away-day is back 
on. C takes what she has heard as raising the possibility that the strike might have ended 
aŶd thus she ĐheĐks ǁhetheƌ it has. C does Ŷot ďelieǀe “͛s testiŵoŶǇ aŶd a forteriori does 
not believe S. C is within her rights to behave as she does. Were anyone to challenge C as to 
why she does not believe S, C is entitled to say that S is not even talking to her. C is not in a 
position to ask S for clarifications that C might want, and thus S should not have any 
expectations that C unquestioningly believes S. Again, S should neither resent nor feel 
disappointed in C. These are two examples where testimony refusal is neither insulting nor a 
source of interpersonal disappointment because the refusal is justified rather than being a 
manifestation of ill will or disregard toward the testifier. 
Among strangers, the refusal of testimony is insulting only when it is based on 
uŶǁaƌƌaŶted Ŷegatiǀe judgeŵeŶts aďout the testifieƌ͛s ŵoƌal oƌ iŶtelleĐtual character. For 
example, it feels insulting if hearers do not believe one because, seemingly without good 
reason, they think one is a manipulator, a liar, or they think that one is irrational, stupid or 
lazy.17 What is insulting is, without good reasons, to be believed untrustworthy. I first argue 
that being presumed untrustworthy is insulting, before defending the view that it is not 
insulting not to be presumed to be trustworthy. 
 
17 These thoughts do not need to be consciously endorsed. They can take the form of implicit attitudes 
governing behaviour. 
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Sincerity and competence are essential character traits of epistemic agents. Those 
who are seriously lacking in either of these two regards are not dependable and, therefore, 
unfit to play the role of informants. That is, without these traits one lacks the credentials 
required to function as a testifier. To be judged untrustworthy is to be thought of as lacking 
one or both of these traits. If one is not trusted because one is believed to be stupid, lazy or 
irrational, one is judged to be incompetent. If one is not trusted because one is believed to 
be a liar or a manipulator, it is oŶe͛s siŶĐeƌitǇ that is Đalled iŶto ƋuestioŶ.18 Eitheƌ ǁaǇ, oŶe͛s 
status as an epistemic agent is diminished, and if this diminution is unwarranted, it is an 
insult.19 
It might be objected that unwarranted negative judgements about 
untrustworthiness are not necessary for the refusal of testimony to be an insult. Instead, it 
would be sufficient that a speaker is not presumed to be trustworthy. According to this view 
a testifier is insulted whenever, in the absence of any reasons to doubt her trustworthiness, 
her testimony is refused. If this is right, ill will or lack of due regard are not required to insult 
a testifier, it is enough that the audience does not presume that the speaker is competent 
and sincere.20 
This objection neglects the difference between testimonial insult and testifier 
disappointment. It is insulting to be presumed untrustworthy without good reason. It is not 
insulting not to be presumed trustworthy, even though it is disappointing. The thumbnail 
examples presented above illustrate this point. In Case 1 S is insulted because in her view A 
has taken her to be lying perhaps out of a desire to have more beers for herself. A has thus 
shown ill will toward S who therefore resents her. In Case 3 S is disappointed in A because of 
heƌ failuƌe to ďelieǀe “. “ does Ŷot ƌeseŶt A, hoǁeǀeƌ, ďeĐause A͛s Ŷod aŶd sŵile iŶdiĐate 
that no ill will was intended. For instance, A might just, out of thirst, have hoped that S got it 
wrong and that some beer was to be found in the fridge. These examples indicate that 
speakers are entitled to normatively expect not to be distrusted without a reason as evinced 
by the legitimacy of resentful responses. Speakers are not entitled to normatively expect to 
 
18 Some of these points are also defended in Malcolm (2018). 
19 If this is right the injustice at the heart of testimonial injustice is that those whose credibility is deflated have 
been insulted because they have been diminished as epistemic agents (Fricker, 2007). In this paper I set aside 
the further question whether it is ever morally permissible to insult someone. 
20 Thanks to John Greco for raising this objection. 
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be trusted without a reason. Speakers are warranted in their disappointment in hearers who 
do not take them to be trustworthy, but even in the absence of justifications or excuses, 
speakers do not resent strangers who, without ill will, do not trust them. 
I hasten to add that a speaker might feel disappointed or insulted and thus feel let 
down by or resent an audience, even though these reactions are unwarranted. For instance, 
an arrogant individual might have developed lazy ways of thinking, whilst because of her 
arrogance she continue to present her opinions as fact. Her hearers might think of her as 
untrustworthy because she is lazy. Learning of their views, she might feel insulted. But their 
judgment is warranted, and she has no right to resent them. Conversely, a testifier might 
not feel insulted even though she has been. She might, for instance, not be aware that she is 
not believed because, being a blond feminine woman, she is thought to be too stupid or 
vapid to know the difference between fact and mere opinion. 
So far I have highlighted the differences between cases of testimony refusals that are 
warranted or justified because the audience has a reason to doubt the sincerity or 
competence of a speaker; those that are insulting because the audience presumes without 
reason that the speaker is untrustworthy, and thereby demonstrates some kind of ill will 
toward the testifier; and those that are the cause of interpersonal disappointment because 
hearers are resistant to testimonial uptake but such resistance is due to factors that are not 
indicative of ill will. Thus, a speaker might be disappointed in an audience that does not 
believe her because it is made up of doubting Thomases, or of individuals whose wish that 
what the speaker said is not true makes them ignore the testimony, or of people who are 
distracted, forgetful or so anxious that they often double check what others say.  
It is of sigŶifiĐaŶĐe that ƌefusals of testiŵoŶial uptake that ǁaƌƌaŶt speakeƌ͛s 
disappointment (but not resentment) in the hearer are not limited to cases where the 
hearer has an excuse for her behaviour or is (temporarily or permanently) exempted from 
participation in the practice of testimony. Wishing that the speaker is wrong is not an 
excuse for not believing her (or an exemption from the norms of testimony). Nevertheless, 
speakers usually do not resent those who do not believe them out of wishful thinking that 
things might be otherwise. This consideration is important because it shows that testifier 
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disappointment cannot always be construed as a response to a violation of mandatory 
obligation mitigated by an excuse or nullified by an exemption. 21 
Audiences also can resent or be disappointed in testifiers. Resentment is fitting in 
Đases of testiŵoŶial ďetƌaǇal ǁheŶ the audieŶĐe͛s tƌust is iŶteŶtioŶallǇ eǆploited ďǇ the 
speaker. Betrayal occurs when a testifier lies to, or intentionally misleads, an audience that 
had put its trust in her. By acting in this manner the speaker exhibits ill will or at least lack of 
due regard toward her audience. The speaker might also be diminishing hearers by 
presuming them to be credulous or gullible. Either way, in such cases the audience is 
warranted in resenting the speaker. Thus, audience betrayal and testimonial insult are each 
otheƌ͛s ŵiƌƌoƌ iŵage. The speakeƌ ǁho is iŶsulted ďǇ heƌ audience is wronged by them and 
thus is rightly resentful. Similarly, a hearer who is betrayed by a speaker is equally wronged 
and justified in her resentment. 
Hearers might also be disappointed in a testifier when they trusted her and are let 
down. This occurs when the speaker does not share information or is not fully reliable but 
these failures are not expressions of ill will since they are caused by distraction, temporary 
lapses or by some aspect of the circumstances. The testifier might be too shy to speak, 
might have forgotten some relevant evidence, might misspeak out of carelessness, or have a 
propensity to spread mere hearsay. These aƌe all Đases ǁheƌe ageŶts͛ ďehaǀiouƌ has falleŶ 
short of what was hoped of them, but that do not warrant resentment because the 
speakeƌ͛s ĐoŶduĐt is Ŷot a ŵaŶifestatioŶ of ill ǁill oƌ laĐk of pƌopeƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ.22 These also are 
not always examples where excuses or exemptions are present. Being careless is not excuse 
foƌ ŵisleadiŶg oŶe͛s audieŶĐe ďut it ĐaŶ ďe adduĐed to show that one does not deserve to 
be resented. 
These considerations draw the contours of the circumstances in which resenting or 
feeling let down by the speaker or the audience might be fitting. They show that 
 
21 See Strawson (2008, pp. 7-10) for a discussion of mitigating and exculpating circumstances.  
22 The notion of hope I have in mind here is akin to what Martin (2014) has characterised as normative hope. 
Hoping something of someone entails desiring that they aspire to comply with some good principle or goal 
without requiring that they do. Martin thinks that the attitude of hope is independent of the normative status 
of what is hoped of someone. Hence, one can both demand and hope of a person that she does what she is 
duty bound to do. I do not disagree in principle but her examples of disappointment (because of unmet hopes) 
in someone who failed to do her duty, are all instances where excuses or partial exemptions are present. Mere 
disappointment without excusing or exempting circumstances indicates the existence of cases where the 
failure is not a violation of a mandatory obligation. 
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disappointment is the natural response to lack of trustworthiness or of trust that is not 
indicative of ill will or lack of due regard even though it is not the result of factors that might 
serve as an excuse or as an exemption. 
However, testimonial exchanges do not exclusively elicit negative reactive attitudes, 
positive responses are more widespread. To my knowledge, this point has been largely 
ignored in the existing philosophical literature on testimony, but not in that dedicated to 
trust (Darwall, 2017, 2019). Malcolm (2018) briefly discusses this possibility when he 
considers testimonial praise as the opposite of the blame that would accrue to those who 
insult speakers. He claims that praise for testimony is rare because we do not compliment 
people for meeting our normative expectations. Praise would only occur when speakers are 
judged to be especially eminent authorities on the topic of their testimony. 
In my opinion Malcolm focuses on the wrong aspect of appraisal by thinking of 
testimonial insult as blameworthy testimony and testimonial compliment as praiseworthy 
testimony. What is crucial to testimonial insult is that it warrants the participant attitude of 
resentment that is a response to perceived ill will or at least lack of due regard in others. Its 
opposite therefore is not praise but gratitude that is the natural response to perceived good 
ǁill oƌ speĐial ƌegaƌd iŶ otheƌs͛ attitudes toǁaƌd us (Strawson, 2008, p. 6). 
The positive reactive attitudes of gratitude and gratification are commonplace in 
testimonial exchanges. Audiences are very often grateful to testifiers. They manifest their 
appreciation in a variety of ways. These include thanking the person who has given them the 
information, applauding after the delivery of a lecture, or simply nodding as a way to agree 
but also to offer support. These appreciative responses are not merely commonplace; they 
are normatively expected, but not demanded, by speakers. If S gives A some valuable 
information, S expects A to thank her or manifest her appreciation in some way.23 If A fails 
to do so, S feels let down by A and thinks that A is ungrateful. S might even resolve not to be 
as helpful to A in future. Nevertheless, S might not be warranted in resenting A. A teacher, 
for instance, might be disappointed if her class shows no appreciation at the end of a course 
of lectures, but she has no right to resent them. 
 
23 See Macnamara (2013) for a discussion of thanking as an expression of gratitude. 
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Speakers generally find the giving of testimony to be gratifying. This is a self-directed 
attitude that manifests the feeling that in doing something for other people one has fulfilled 
some standards to which one aspires. Meeting such standards is an occasion for joy and for 
a sense of self-satisfaction or self-approbation.  
Testimony routinely elicits positives reactive attitudes of gratitude and gratification 
because it involves acts that are generous since they are not mandatory and there is no 
guarantee of reciprocation.24 When the testifier tells something to her hearers she meets 
their hopes of her by benefiting them out of her own good will or because of her regard for 
their interests. The audience properly responds to this behaviour by giving their thanks. 
Gratitude in response to testimony indicates that the audience takes the giving of testimony 
as a manifestation of good will which is reciprocated with a grateful response that is also an 
expression good will. 25 “uĐh appƌeĐiatioŶ of oŶe͛s ďeŶeǀoleŶĐe is iŶ tuƌŶ appƌeĐiated ďǇ the 
speaker. It also elicits in her a self-directed attitude of satisfaction and gratification. It is the 
routine nature of these positive reactive attitudes that, I speculate, might explain why they 
have not attracted the philosophical attention that they deserve. Because they are almost 
always present they are not noticed, whilst the infrequent occurrence of insult, betrayal or 
disappointment might explain why they have attracted attention. 
The widespread occurrence of positive reactive attitude in testimonial exchanges is 
instructive about the normative expectations that structure this epistemic practice. It 
suggests that the norms governing testimony are not imperatives that institute mandatory 
obligations.26 They instead serve as standards about the kind of regard or good will toward 
others one commits to and normatively expects others to aspire to. Gratification and 
 
24 One might object that we routinely thank people for doing what we contracted them to do. Gratitude would 
thus be appropriate in some cases when people merely act as they ought. I disagree. I think examples where 
this seems to be the case are best explained differently. Sometimes we are grateful when people go beyond 
their duty by doing what they ought with special care or concern. Sometimes thanks are given out of 
politeness rather than gratitude. Neither example is therefore an instance of gratitude merely in response to 
the fulfilŵeŶt of dutǇ. A ƌelated oďjeĐtioŶ is ďased oŶ MaƌtiŶ͛s (2014) observation that we can be grateful to 
people for doing things which we would resent them for not doing. Thus, we are grateful to people who help 
us when we are in difficulty and whom we would resent if they did not help. I agree that we are grateful to 
those who help us, but these are often cases where failure to assist should not be met with resentment but 
with disappointment. 
25 In short, when gratitude and disappointment are in place agents purport to cooperate. But cooperation is 
promoted, rather than presupposed, by hopeful attitudes generating gratitude or disappointment. Thanks to 
John Greco for forcing me to be clearer on this issue. 
26 I say at least some because we do have a norm not to lie that institutes mandatory obligations. It should be 
noted though that lying is one among many expressions of ill will that can occur in testimonial exchanges. 
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gratitude are the warranted responses for meeting these standards, disappointment for 
failing to do so in a manner that does not warrant resentment. I argue in the final section of 
this paper that the call and response structure that characterises testimonial exchanges 
institutes reciprocating normative pressures of a kind characteristic of gift economies. It is 
because it is governed by these social norms that the epistemic practice of testimony offers 
such a powerful a solution to the problem of cooperation in the sharing of information. 
 
 
3. Reactive Attitudes and Speech Acts 
 
In this section I show that the speech act of telling that is the typical vehicle of testimonial 
exchanges should be thought of as an offer of information that is an expression of good will. 
It is not best understood as the giving of an assurance that is akin to promising. 27 Telling, 
thus, emerges as a commissive speech act but one that is unlike promising. When offering 
or promising to do something, the speaker acquires a new normative status in relation to 
what she offered or promised. If she offered, she has a new reason to follow through; if she 
promised, she is duty bound to do so. In this regard, offers are less demanding than 
promises. 
To see that in ordinary circumstances tellings are unlike promises, it is helpful to 
consider examples of exceptional cases where telling is promising. When individuals are 
called to testify in the context of a trial, they are required to swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Effectively, witnesses in court promise to tell the 
tƌuth iŶfoƌŵatiǀelǇ. IŶ this legal ĐoŶteǆt a ǁitŶess͛s telliŶg addƌessed at aŶ audieŶĐe consists 
 
27 I wish here to remain neutral about whether telling is a necessary feature of testimony. There are in my view 
ways of transferring knowledge that do not involve telling. For instance, anonymous assertion might be a 
source of information even though it lacks a recognisable speaker. This consideration though does not settle 
the issue, since testimony could be identified with a specific means of knowledge transferral that might occur 
only through telling. See Faulkner (2014, pp. 168-169) for a discussion of this issue. In addition, there might be 
discursive contexts in which special norms override the normative statuses associated by default with telling. 
For example, academics are meant to question rather than trust the testimony of other experts. 
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in the giving of an assurance. Because she has sworn, the witness has acquired a promissory 
obligation to speak and to do so truthfully. 
Arguably, we have this practice because in ordinary circumstances speakers do not 
have the same duty to tell the truth informatively. Speakers are generally under no 
obligation to address their audience by means of the speech act of telling. Instead, they 
typically freely choose to speak out of regard for, or good will toward, their addressees. 
Further, when speaking, speakers invite the trust of their audience as a fitting response to 
their actions. By way of contrast, when placed in the witness box, a speaker does not invite 
otheƌs͛ tƌust, iŶstead she authoƌises the state oŶ ďehalf of heƌ audieŶĐe to puŶish heƌ if she 
commits perjury. 
It might be argued that this description overplays the differences between ordinary 
and witness testimony. Even in normal circumstances, speakers are under an obligation not 
to lie. That is, they must be sincere. They must either keep silent or say what they believe to 
be true. Even if these observations are correct, they do no show that in ordinary testimony 
speakers give assurances as to the truth of their testimony. In order to give such an 
assurance, a promise of sincerity would be insufficient. One would also have to promise that 
one has the right kind of epistemic standing with regard to the asserted content. In short, 
one must not for example put forward guesses, even when sincerely believed, as testimony. 
Witnesses are obliged under oath not to present guesses or hearsay as truth. Speakers in 
ordinary circumstances are not equally duty bound. The fact that addressees usually are 
disappointed in, but do not resent, speakers who are prone to misspeak or assert mere 
hearsay shows that these speakers have not violated some duty toward us (since a 
propensity to behave in these ways does not excuse this behaviour or exempt speakers 
from criticism). 
In what follows I first explain the appeal of understanding telling as a kind of 
promise. Subsequently, I detail the different normative statuses instituted by promising and 
offering, before defending the view that telling is offering some information in gift to an 
audience. The analysis of telling as a speech act that is akin to promising can be traced to 
Austin (1961) but has been more recently elaborated and defended by Moran (2006). 
According to this view the speech act of telling consists in the giving of an assurance to the 
addressee. More specifically, S in telling A that p assumes responsibility for her utterance 
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furnishing A with a reason to believe that p. That is, S assures (or promises to) A that S 
shoulders the responsibility for the epistemic status of p, so that were A to believe p and p 
not to be warranted, the epistemic blame would be apportioned to S and not to A. Telling 
would thus be a kind of promising since it would institute new binding obligations on the 
speaker successfully to defend the asserted content. 
We ĐaŶ paƌaphƌase MoƌaŶ͛s positioŶ iŶ the folloǁiŶg teƌŵs. IŶ his view when S tells 
A that p, “ also iŵpliĐitlǇ ĐoŶǀeǇs: ͚Tƌust ŵe! I sǁeaƌ͛. BǇ giǀiŶg this kiŶd of assuƌaŶĐe, the 
speaker takes the responsibility that p has the kind of normative epistemic status that is 
ƌeƋuiƌed to ŵake “͛s asseƌtioŶ that p ĐoŵpliaŶt ǁith the norm or norms (whatever these 
happens to be) that govern assertion.28 The speaker also confers on her addressee a right or 
entitlement to hold her responsible for the propriety of her assertion. So that were the 
assertion not in accordance with the norm(s), the addressee could blame the speaker for 
violating her obligations. 
Even though aspects of the analogy of telling with promising are compelling, it 
cannot capture the full normative structure of telling in the context of testimonial 
exchanges. One initial source of worry is the observation that the speech act of telling 
involves an invitation to trust (Hinchman, 2005). But invitations to trust do not put agents 
under the same kind of normative pressure that is imposed upon them by promises. For 
example, a person might refuse to promise to a friend to keep her room tidy, and at the 
same time invite the friend to trust her that she will do it. This person is refusing to acquire 
a promissory obligation to be tidy, whilst being prepared fully to commit to tidiness out of 
her regard for her friend. In this manner one indicates that one will do something not out of 
duty but out of love or care (cf., Darwall, 2017, p. 43). The person who promises makes 
herself liable to be resented and blamed if, barring excuses, justifications or exemptions, she 
violates her newly acquired obligatioŶ. The peƌsoŶ ǁho has iŶǀited the otheƌ͛s tƌust also 
fully commits to the course of action but makes herself liable only to disappointment, 
shame, guilt or hurt feelings if she lets herself and others down by not following through. 
 
28 That status might be truth, knowledge, or justified belief. See Goldberg (2015) for an evaluation of different 
positions on the norm or norms that govern assertion. 
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These considerations suggest that the reactive attitudes of gratitude, gratification 
and disappointment that are commonly presents in testimonial exchanges are not what one 
would expect if telling, like promising, institutes mandatory obligations. Instead, these 
responses seem typical of situations where individuals offer to benefit someone out of a 
ƌegaƌd foƌ the otheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s iŶteƌests. IŶ ŵakiŶg offeƌs iŶdiǀiduals Đoŵŵit to staŶdaƌds aŶd 
make themselves liable to criticism (but not resentment) if they, without malice or cold-
heartedness, fail to meet them. In order to show that telling is like offering something and 
unlike promising, more needs to be said about these two kinds of speech act. 
In what follows I describe the normative statuses that are instituted by these speech 
acts and argue that the pragmatic analysis of telling shows that it is an offer of knowledge, 
truth or justified belief rather than a promise that one told the truth (or that what one told 
is knowledge or justified belief). I borrow from Kukla and Lance (2009) the vocabulary of 
constitutive goal and normative output to characterise the pragmatics of speech acts. The 
constitutive goal of a speech act is the state of affairs that comes to pass if the speech act is 
wholly successful. The normative outputs of a speech act are the changes in normative 
statuses that are instituted by the speech act. This framework is helpful to clarify how 
making an offer differs from promising.  
Both pƌoŵises aŶd offeƌs aƌe iŶ AustiŶ͛s teƌŵiŶologǇ Đoŵŵissiǀes siŶĐe theǇ aƌe 
ways iŶ ǁhiĐh a speakeƌ Đoŵŵits to a Đouƌse of aĐtioŶ. OffeƌiŶg to Φ aŶd pƌoŵisiŶg to Φ 
have the same constitutive goal since if the offer or promise is fully successful then the 
speakeƌ has Φ-ed. These speech acts differ in their normative outputs. When a speaker 
pƌoŵises to Φ she aĐƋuiƌes a ceteris paribus ŵaŶdatoƌǇ oďligatioŶ to Φ. Heƌ addƌessee 
aĐƋuiƌes aŶ eŶtitleŵeŶt to hold heƌ ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ Φ-ing, and to resent her if she does not. 
WheŶ a speakeƌ offeƌs to Φ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ pƌoŵises to Φ, she aĐƋuiƌes a discretionary 
oďligatioŶ to Φ.  
The notion of a discretionary obligation might seem an oxymoron since if something 
is a matter of discretion it is not obligatory. I use this expression to convey the idea that the 
person who makes an offer to Φ, acquires a ƌeasoŶ to Φ and makes herself liable to criticism 
if she does not Φ. But this criticism is not of a kind that is warranted by the violation of a 
mandatory obligation. Her addressee is not entitled to resent S if she does not Φ. He is 
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entitled to express disappointment in S since she committed to Φ-ing, and her failure 
(barring excuses, justifications or exemptions) reflects badly on her. 
The difference between promises and offers mirrors the relation between orders 
and requests. This analogy might help to further clarify how offers are related to promises. 
OƌdeƌiŶg soŵeoŶe to Φ aŶd ƌeƋuestiŶg that she does haǀe the saŵe ĐoŶstitutiǀe goal siŶĐe 
if theǇ aƌe fullǇ suĐĐessful the addƌessee Φ-es. They differ however in their normative 
outputs. The recipient of an oƌdeƌ aĐƋuiƌes a ŵaŶdatoƌǇ oďligatioŶ to Φ so that she ĐaŶ ďe 
blamed if she does not. The recipient of a request has the discretionary power not to accede 
to it, Ŷeǀeƌtheless she aĐƋuiƌes a ƌeasoŶ to Φ, that is to saǇ a disĐƌetioŶaƌǇ oďligatioŶ to do 
so. Hence, the peƌsoŶ ǁho issued the ƌeƋuest ĐaŶŶot ďlaŵe the addƌessee foƌ Ŷot Φ-ing. He 
might however be disappointed in her if she refuses his request. 
With these distinctions in place we can return to the examples of disappointment 
and gratitude in response to testimonial exchanges discussed in section two above. I submit 
that these cases are not easily explicable if telling like promising institutes mandatory 
obligations. 
Consider first the example of testifier disappointment. In this case A does not take 
“͛s ǁoƌd ďut iŶstead ĐheĐks foƌ heƌself ďeĐause A is of a sĐeptiĐal dispositioŶ oƌ siŵplǇ 
because A hopes that S has made a mistake. In response S is disappointed in A. Contrast this 
reaction with a case where a promissee behaves in ways that indicate that she does not 
think that a promissor will do as promised. Suppose S promises to A that she will bring the 
cake to the party. If S finds out that A has bought the cake herself, S would resent A rather 
than be disappointed in her. S would find it offensive that A presumed S would not fulfil her 
promise. Ceteris paribus, it is insulting rather than disappointing when others without good 
eǀideŶĐe pƌesuŵe that oŶe ǁill Ŷot fulfil oŶe͛s pƌoŵises. OŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ, it is oŶlǇ 
disappointing rather than insulting when others without good evidence do not take one at 
oŶe͛s ǁoƌd pƌoǀided that theiƌ ďehaǀiouƌ is Ŷot ŵotiǀated ďǇ ill ǁill oƌ iŶsuffiĐieŶt ƌegaƌd 
toward one. 
Similar observations can be made about the disanology between breaking a promise 
and the example of audience disappointment. In the latter case A believes S, but S lets A 
doǁŶ ďeĐause “͛s testiŵoŶǇ is the ƌesult of ĐaƌelessŶess oƌ gulliďilitǇ. IŶ suĐh Đase, A ŵight 
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be disappointed in, without resenting, S provided S has shown no ill will toward A. The 
natural reactions to breaking a promise out of carelessness are different. Suppose that S 
promises to A to bring a cake, but does not fulfil her promise. In response, barring excuses, 
justifications or exemptions, S resents A. Carelessness is not, in this case, an excuse that 
would warrant replacing resentment with disappointment. Further, if a person is poor at 
promise keeping, those who know her track record are likely to stop relying on her. They do 
not, however, stop resenting her unless they come to believe that she is constitutionally 
unable to keep a promise. Again, the reactive attitudes that are at home in testimonial 
exchanges are different. If A takes a speaker S at her word, and ends up being disappointed 
ďeĐause of “͛s oĐĐasioŶal oƌ permanent carelessness, A does not generally resent S but feels 
let down. In short the reactions of hearers to a speaker they trusted who lets them down 
are different from the responses that befit those who carelessly break their promises. 
I have pointed out in section two that the most common reactive attitude to 
testimony is gratitude. This reaction is only rarely at home in response to promises. Most 
commonly, we are not grateful to people merely for keeping their promises, although out of 
politeness we might thank them. There are times, however, when we are grateful to people 
for their promises. In these cases we might be grateful for the offer of a promise, when they 
were under no obligation to do so. On other occasions, we might also be grateful that things 
turned out as someone promised they would. We are especially prone to this response 
ǁheŶ ǁe ďelieǀe that it is Ŷot fullǇ iŶ that peƌsoŶ͛s gift to deliǀeƌ oŶ the pƌoŵise. FiŶallǇ, 
rarely, we are genuinely grateful to people for delivering on a promise. Typically, this 
happens when we treat people as being partially or wholly exempt from promise-making 
because they are seriously deficient in, or lack, the capacities required to keep their word. In 
these cases we take these individuals as not being fully capable of promising, and read their 
words as indicating that they aspire, rather than promise, to deliver and thus are grateful 
when they do. Hence, for example, we might be grateful when a child keeps her promise, 
whilst we are not prepared to resent her if she does not. By way of contrast, genuine 
gratitude rather than mere politeness is in ordinary circumstances the most common 
response to testimony. 
It might be objected that my account of telling as the offering of information must 
be wrong since the audience blames the speaker, if, having trusted the speaker, the 
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audience believes something false. These attributions of blame are not predicated on the 
quality of the regard that the speaker has for her hearers. Even if the speaker is well-
intentioned she is a suitable target for reproach, if she has shared information of low 
quality. 
This objection is in my view predicated on a confusion between epistemic and moral 
blame. If S tells A that p, and A believes that p because A trusts S, were p to be false or 
indefensible, A is epistemically blameless for her belief unless she had evidence available to 
heƌ poiŶtiŶg to “͛s uŶƌeliaďilitǇ oƌ uŶtƌustǁoƌthiŶess. “ ŵight iŶstead ďe episteŵiĐallǇ 
blameworthy for her belief that p if, for instance, she has been careless in acquiring it or 
could not offer any consideration in its support. Thus, when we say that in the case of 
testimony, an audience is entitled to hold the speaker responsible for the epistemic status 
and defensibility of the asserted content, it is epistemic responsibility and thus epistemic 
blame that we have in mind.29 Failure in this kind of responsibility does not warrant 
resentment or punishment.30 We do not resent people for their false or careless beliefs. 
Instead, we might be disappointed in them and be disposed to criticise them for their 
shortcomings. By the same token, we are not grateful to people because they have 
exercised epistemic responsibility when acquiring their beliefs. By contrast we resent 
individuals who betray our trust or who refuse our testimony in ways that are insulting. We 
are also grateful to those who share information with us. 
These differences in reactive attitudes point to different kinds of appraisals. The 
responsibility-responses that are appropriate in response to blameworthy belief acquisition 
 
29 “peakeƌs͛ episteŵiĐ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ Đoŵpƌises a ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to haǀiŶg the ĐoƌƌeĐt episteŵiĐ staŶdiŶg ǀis à vis 
the asserted content and to be answerable to legitimate challenges. I have elsewhere labelled these as the 
accountability and answerability commitments that are partly constitutive of a speech act as an assertion 
(Tanesini, 2016). I now think that I ǁas ǁƌoŶg to suggest that speakeƌs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to siŶĐeƌitǇ ǁas a thiƌd 
commitment alongside these two. We are warranted to resent insincere speakers but we are not equally 
warranted in resenting speakers who fail to discharge their accountability and answerability commitments. In 
Kukla aŶd LaŶĐe͛s (2009) terminology there are agent neutral and agent relative (or second-personal) 
dimensions to the normative inputs and outputs of the speech act of telling. The accountability commitment, 
for example, institutes a mandatory obligation that might be thought as flowing from agent-neutral normative 
inputs to the speech act of telling. The discretionary obligations that are my focus here pertain to the agent-
relative dimension of telling. I now also have reservations about using the accountability label for one of the 
two commitments that are partly constitutive of assertion. 
30 This point is ably defended by Brown (2018). 
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or retention are those characteristic of attributability responsibility.31 That is, a person is 
epistemically blameworthy for her belief only if some bad character trait attributable to her 
has caused her to acquire or retain the belief in question. Dogmatic beliefs and beliefs that 
are carelessly acquired would be examples of beliefs that are blameworthy in this distinctive 
epistemic sense. 
The responsibility-responses that are appropriate in response to trust and 
trustworthiness are those characteristic of accountability responsibility. When individuals 
are blamed for their untrustworthiness or distrust they are evaluated for the quality of thei 
care for other people. These evaluations of blame that target the regard that one has for 
others are distinctly moral. They usually signal that the blameworthy person has wronged 
the other party in the exchange, who legitimately resents the wrongdoer. 
Thus, in response to the objection, it is not true that, if a speaker S tells that p to an 
audieŶĐe A ǁho ďelieǀes that p oŶ “͛s saǇiŶg so, A ďlaŵes “ iŶ a seŶse that liĐeŶses 
resentment were S to be found to have acquired p in an epistemically careless fashion. 
IŶstead, A͛s ďlaŵe ǁould ďe eǆpƌessed ďǇ ǁaǇ of the kiŶd of ĐƌitiĐisŵs aŶd ƌeaĐtiǀe 
attitudes that are consonant to epistemic blameworthiness. These considerations are 
orthogonal to the kind of responsibility responses with which I am concerned. My focus 
here is on the reactive attitudes that fit trust and trustworthiness. These are accountability 
responses including resentment, disappointment and gratitude.32 
To summarise, I have argued that the reactive attitudes that are natural responses to 
the giving and receiving of testimony indicate that tellings have the normative outputs of 
offers rather than promises. Whilst when promising one acquires a mandatory obligation to 
do as promised, offers institute discretionary obligations. When offering one fully commits 
to fulfil the offer, but one is not liable to be resented if one falls short provided that the 
failure is not attributable to ill will or a lack of due regard. 
 
 
31 They also involve responses characteristic of answerability responsibility including calls that one defends 
oŶe͛s judgeŵeŶts. “ee Shoemaker (2015) for an account of attributability, accountability and answerability as 
different kinds of responsibility identifiable by the different kinds of reactive attitudes they give rise to. 
32 The considerations supply the groundwork for assessing whether trusting a speaker supplies an epistemic or 
a practical reason for believing what a speaker says. I set this thorny issue aside. 
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4. Gift Economy and Norms of Reciprocity 
 
I have argued so far that the pragmatics of the speech act of telling that is the main vehicle 
of testimony and the kind of reactive attitudes that are fitting on the part of both giver and 
recipient of testimony point to thinking of the transfer of epistemic goods in testimony as a 
kind of offer. In what follows I argue that the offer of testimony is best understood as the 
offer of a gift rather than a market transaction driven by utility maximisation. If this is right, 
one may speculate as to why a testimonial practice governed by these norms has emerged 
and how it can solve the problem of cooperation. To answer this question I present briefly 
some key features of gift-exchange games before suggesting that these are present in our 
practice of testimony. Subsequently, I argue that social norms relying on good will are 
especially suitable to solve the cooperation problem with regard to non-rivalrous goods. In 
addition, these norms supply incentives to knowledge acquisition. 
I have argued that tellings are offers. Offers, however, can be somewhat varied 
depending on the nature of the commitments they involve. One can offer to do something 
for someone; one can offer a price in the purchase of a good. One can make an offering in 
the form of a giving of a gift. Tellings are best construed as offers of this last kind since they 
are the means of transferring a valuable good – information- without expressly asking for 
anything in return. Understood in this way tellings are acts of offering information as a gift. 
Practices of gift exchanges have attracted significant interest in anthropology 
(Mauss, 1990). More recently, ethnographers and economists have studied the behaviour of 
human actors noting that people often violate the axiom of selfishness since they do act in 
ways that do not maximise their self-interest. For example, there are individuals that treat 
Ultimatum games as they would the sharing of a gift because in a situation in which utility 
theory dictates that they make as small an offer as possible, they offer instead over half of 
the total amount.33 It would seem that these participants treat the game as an opportunity 
 
33 In an Ultimatum game there are two anonymous participants engaging in one interaction. There is a fixed 
total pay off and one participant is instructed to offer to the other a portion of it. The respondent can accept 
the offer, or reject it. If she accepts she gets what was offered. If she rejects, neither gets anything. Under 
these conditions, if participants seek to maximise their payoff, it is rational for the respondent to accept any 
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to make a gift without a binding agreement about what they can expect in return (Henrich 
et al., 2004). Their respondents often reject the generous offer in order not to feel 
committed to be generous to their benefactor (Bicchieri, 2006).34 
For my purposes what is essential to the exchange of gifts is that the donor makes an 
offer that can be described as generous since it is an offer that benefits the recipient 
without guaranteeing a return for the donor. Another crucial characteristic of gift giving is 
that it institutes relations of indebtedness. That is, although the exchange of the gift does 
not strictly speaking and legally obligate the recipient to match the gift with another of at 
least equivalent value, the social norms governing these exchanges incentivise the recipient 
to discharge the debt of generosity she has incurred by being generous in return. This 
feature of gift exchanges makes them very costly to recipients because what they have a 
reason to reciprocate is the generous gesture. In this context, donating a gift of equivalent 
value might feel ungenerous. There is therefore a pressure to exchange gifts of increasing 
value among agents who engage in repeated exchanges. In this way, it is possible to become 
ďaŶkƌupt iŶ the atteŵpt to keep up ǁith oŶe͛s geŶeƌous fƌieŶds. Foƌ this ƌeasoŶ, iŶ soŵe 
societies people avoid putting themselves in a position where others might make them a gift 
or offer help (Bicchieri, 2006). 
I have argued that testimony involves the making of offers that create discretionary 
obligations, among these are the discretionary obligation to reciprocate the generous gift of 
information. Individuals in the receipt of testimony are expected to show gratitude because 
the good that they have received was voluntarily and generously given. They are also 
expected to reciprocate by serving themselves as donors of testimony. This structure of 
discretionary obligations to reciprocate that finds expression in positive reactive attitudes of 
gratitude and gratification is exactly what one would expect if our norms of trust and 
trustworthiness regulated a system of gift exchanges rather than market transactions. 
The adoption of social norms consistent with treating the exchange of some goods as 
gift-giving can provide a solution to the problem of cooperation. The problem in its original 
formulation presupposes agents who seek to maximise their preferences, but agents who 
 
positive offer. Consequently, It is rational for the first participant to offer as little as possible (cf., Henrich et al., 
2004, p. 11). 
34 Thus, they appear to ignore the fact that there will not be an opportunity to reciprocate. 
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follow the social norms of gift giving have different motives since they think that they have 
reasons to give generous gifts and reciprocate any gift that they have received. So the 
adoption of these norms solves the problem in its original formulation. The details of the 
solution would differ from the account of it supplied by Faulkner (2014). On his view the 
norms of trust and trustworthiness are imperatives that institute mandatory obligations. 
The norms themselves are sustained through the negative incentives of punishment and 
resentment. In my account these norms set standards to which we commit in aspiring to 
meet them. The norms themselves are sustained by the incentive of gratification and the 
disincentive of disappointment. 
Interestingly, a problem similar to that of cooperation can be reformulated in the 
context of gift economies. This is the problem of parasites invasion. That is, why should we 
expect a society governed by gift giving practices to preserve its customs when faced with a 
group of people who exchange initial gifts and then defect? The nature of gifts themselves 
might provide an answer. Usually, the transfers of gifts is highly inefficient since the donor 
gives away something that is more valuable to her, than it is to her recipient. Some gifts are 
also perishable so that they cannot be recycled by parasites. This explains some of the most 
common features of items that people gift. Flowers are perishable and thus cannot be re-
gifted. Others goods cost more to the donor than the use value they have for the recipient. 
This category includes gifts of purely decorative items. It is these inefficiencies that are 
disincentives to parasites thus preventing their invasion (cf., Carmichael & MacLeod, 1997). 
Something akin to exchange inefficacy is evident with regard to testimony. When a 
person gives information to another, the recipient of testimony acquires an epistemic good. 
The testifier loses her positional advantage but she does not lose knowledge. It is in this 
sense that knowledge, unlike positional advantage, is not a rivalrous good. So in the case of 
testimony the testifier loses positional advantage but the recipient does not gain it, while 
the recipient gains information that the donor already had but does not lose.35 This makes 
testimonial exchanges different from standard market transactions where a seller transfers 
property of a good to a buyer who in turn transfers another good (usually money) to the 
buyer. It also makes the transaction inefficient since positional advantage might be the most 
 
35 In addition the donor gains the gratitude of the recipient that induces self-satisfaction in the donor. But this 
process does not seem to involve the transfer of a good. 
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valuable good possessed by the donor. This good is lost by the donor (in relation to that 
recipient) without being gained by the recipient (in relation to that donor).36 
The non-rivalrous nature of epistemic goods might also explain why we engage in 
their exchange rather than avoid situations where we risk incurring unrepayable debts of 
gratitude. The person who gifts to another a piece of information does not lose the ability to 
make the same gift to another individual. This greatly reduces the risk of being made an 
information pauper by discretionary obligations to exchange information generously with 
everyone who generously exchanges it with us. Further, the existence of pressure to make 
bigger and greater gifts of knowledge to other members of the community serves as an 
incentive to seek to acquire more knowledge. The motivation to learn more so that one can 
tell others is epistemically desirable. The creation of this motive is another reason why 
societies that adopt norms regarding the transfer of information that belong to the 
economy of the gift would be epistemically better off than those that do not. 
In conclusion, the natural reactive attitudes of gratitude and gratification 
surrounding testimonial exchanges support the view that telling is a speech act that is closer 
to an offer of a good than to a promise of a good. If this is right, we should think of 
testimony as a form of gift exchange rather than a market transaction governed by 
principles of preference maximisation. Finally, since knowledge is an epistemic good that is 
not rivalrous and can be expanded, the incentive of reciprocation and generous giving 
typical of the gift economy generates a better solution to the problem of pooling 
information than practices based on punishing defection because it also incentivises the 
creation of more knowledge that can be generously donated.37 
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